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Abstract 
Research papers on innovation activity share the view that whenever an invention is made available by a startup 
innovator, getting its ownership by acquisition is beneficial for incumbent firms. In this note, I show by means of an 
example that there are some circumstances in which accomodating entry and competing with the innovator in the 
product market can be substantially more profitable than blocking her entry via acquisition.
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1. Introduction
Research papers on innovation activity share the view that when-
ever an invention is made available by a startup innovator, getting its
ownership by acquisition is beneﬁcial for incumbent ﬁrms (Granstrand
and Sjölander 1990, Anton and Yao 1994, Bloningen and Taylor 2000,
Gans and Stern 2000 and 2002, Grimpe and Hussinger 2008). Even
if the above contributions probably describe the most natural circum-
stances surrounding ownership acquisitions, one may wonder whether
sometimes incumbent ﬁrms could not use alternative methods to avoid
proﬁt erosion resulting from higher quality entry. In this note, I show
that there are some circumstances in which accommodating entry and
competing with the innovator in the product market can be substantially
more proﬁtable than blocking her entry via acquisition. Let me put my
argument in the simplest possible perspective. Consider a market in
which a ﬁrm gains a rent from current sales of its top quality variant.
Assume then that an innovator can put on sale a upgrading product in-
novation, namely a variant with higher quality than the existing one(s).
The commercialization of this novel variant aﬀects the incumbent’s prof-
its along two dimensions. First, the incumbent is now selling a variant
which is no longer at the top of the quality ladder. Second, it is pe-
nalized by the cannibalization eﬀect taking place among two adjacent
variants, as some consumers will now be switching from its own variant
to the innovator’s product1. Accordingly, two arguments could justify
the acquisition of the rival’s product. Indeed, getting the ownership
of the innovation blocks rival’s entry while preserving the top position
in the quality ladder. Furthermore, when acquiring the novel product,
the incumbent can also withdraw from the market its own lower quality
variant thereby neutralizing the cannibalization eﬀect and the harsher
competition such an entry would necessarily entail2. Yet, an alternative
way can sometimes be available to the incumbent to partially escape
from proﬁt erosion resulting from a higher quality entry. It consists for
the incumbent to move its own variant apart from the innovator’s one
by taking the ownership of a downgrading product innovation, namely
an innovation whose quality is lower than the one(s) on sale. In this
alternative scenario, the incumbent ﬁrm would admittedly suﬀer a drop
in proﬁts as it would now obtain proﬁts related to a quality which is
1More generally, given the ﬁnitiness property holding in vertically diﬀerentiated
markets, in the case of upward innovation on sale in the market, the highest-quality
ﬁrm can be either no longer active or scaled down along the quality ladder, depending
on the upperbound to the number of ﬁrms proﬁtably existing at equilibrium.
2An interesting analysis of the incentive to innovate by an incumbent ﬁrm is
provided by Cozzi (2007) in a general framework of endogenous growth.
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lower than before. But, at the same time, it would mitigate the eﬀects
of entry by increasing the gap in qualities, thereby relaxing competition
with the rival. Further, as one would expect the acquisition price to
be positively related to the quality of the purchased product innovation,
the price for acquiring a downgrading product innovation would be lower
than the one paid for the upgrading product innovation. Accordingly,
this diﬀerence in price could possibly compensate the loss in proﬁts that
the incumbent would suﬀer when privileging to scale down the quality
on sale. I show in this paper by means of an example that an incumbent
ﬁrm can indeed prefer in some circumstances to accommodate innova-
tor’s entry through acquiring a downgrading product innovation rather
than to block its entry via preemptive acquisition.
To this aim, I describe a very stylized market which is inspired from
the traditional model of vertical diﬀerentiation. Then, I study in a se-
quential game whether preemptive acquisition of an upgrading innova-
tion always belongs to the optimal path of the game.
2. The basic framework
Assume that there are two ﬁrms, say H and L, providing two dif-
ferent variants of the same good, respectively uH and uL. This latter
is unanimously ranked of being of a lower quality than that of ﬁrm H.
Thus, it is deﬁned as a downgrading variant (with respect to uH). For
simplicity, the average cost with respect to quality is assumed to be equal
to zero. Consumers are identiﬁed by the parameter θ ∈ [a,b], 0 ≤ a < b,
and uniformly distributed with density equal to 1. Utility ui(θ,pi) of
consumer θ for variant i,i = H,F, is given by
ui(θ,pi) = θui − pi, i = H,L,













This assumption guarantees that exactly two ﬁrms can make strictly
positive proﬁts at an interior equilibrium (see Shaked and Sutton, 1981).
I proceed now to deﬁne the demand functions as if the market would be
covered at equilibrium prices. I shall show afterwards that, under the
above assumption, the market is indeed covered at equilibrium. Denote
by   θ the consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying variants H and L
at prices pH and pL, respectively. Solving in θ the equation θuH −pH =
θuL −pL,one obtains   θ =
pH−pL
uH−uL. Then, proﬁt functions ΠH(pH,pL) and
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Maximization of (2) and (3) with respect to pH and pL, respectively,














(b − 2a)(uH − uL)
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Now, one can easily check that, at these equilibrium prices (1), proﬁts
are strictly positive and the market is indeed covered. Substituting these



































3. The innovation game
I assume now that a potential entrant, ﬁrm F, contemplates to enter
the market with an upgrading product innovation, namely a novel vari-
ant uF which is at the top of the quality ladder. Thus uF > uH > uL. In
order to analyze how competition can take place among ﬁrms, I study a
non cooperative sequential innovation game which develops as follows.
At the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent ﬁrm H can realize a preemptive acqui-
sition of the potential entrant at some acquisition price PH. In the case
of preemptive acquisition, the high quality incumbent avoids to openly
compete against the potential rival and takes the ownership of the up-
grading innovation. If preemptive acquisition does not take place, then
at the second stage, the entrant enters the market if there is room for
it. Finally, in the case of de novo entry, in order to compete against the
innovator, the incumbents H can either acquire the low quality rival L at
some acquisition price PL as to oﬀer the downgrading variant uL or keep
on sale its own variant uH. As usual, the game is solved by backward
induction.
3
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3.1 Downgrading innovation under low quality ﬁrm’s
acquisition
Under the assumption that an acquisition agreement has not been
reached by ﬁrms H and F, and thus that the upgrading innovation has
been marketed by the innovator, th high quality incumbent can compete
by either (i) keeping its own variant uH for sale or (ii) acquiring at some
acquisition price the incumbent L and selling the downgrading variant
uL . Of course, ﬁrms’ proﬁts arising at the equilibrium in the market
when de novo entry takes place depends on which of the above strategies
is adopted by the high quality incumbent.




H , and Π
entry
L accruing
to the three ﬁrms F, H and L under innovator’s entry when the two
incumbents H and L do not reach an acquisition agreement and thus
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On the contrary, whenever the high quality incumbent H reaches an
acquisition agreement with L, thereby putting on sale the downward






























It is easy to prove that
Proposition 1 In the case when theupgrading innovation is commer-
cialized by the innovator, the high quality incumbent prefers to acquire
the low quality rival and scale down the quality of the good it oﬀers for
sale only if the market is small and/or its own product is not so diﬀerent
from one of the existing variants.
Proof: See Appendix
The economic rationale is very intuitive. Indeed, in the two above
described circumstances, keeping the existing variant uH in the mar-
ket would make the price competition very ﬁerce thereby reinforcing
the incentive to isolate itself from the other ﬁrm’s product uF via the
downgrading innovation uL.
4
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3.2 De novo entry
Given the natural duopoly structure of the market, whenever acqui-
sition of the innovator is not observed at the ﬁrst stage, this latter can
always enter the market via de novo entry. Indeed, whatever the strat-
egy which is adopted by the high quality incumbent to compete against
the innovator under de novo entry, this always gains positive proﬁts at
equilibrium when marketing on its behalf the innovation uF. Neverthe-
less, in the case of de novo entry, the low quality incumbent is no longer




3.3 Upgrading innovation under entrant’s acquisition
I move now to consider in which circumstances the high quality in-
cumbent prefers to block entry thereby taking the ownership of the up-
ward innovation at the ﬁrst stage of the game. Of course, conditions
under which the acquisition agreement, if any, is deﬁned at this stage
depend on whether the high quality incumbent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
move from its own variant to the downgrading product innovation uL
in the case of de novo entry. Let us assume ﬁrst that in the case of
de novo entry, the incumbent H competes against the innovator while
keeping for sale its own variant uH (scenario A). Then, let us move to
the alternative assumption, namely that in the case of innovator’s entry,
ﬁrm H acquires ﬁrm L thereby selling uL (scenario B). Under these two
assumptions,we analyze the ﬁrst stage of the game.
Scenario A On the one hand, in order to be accepted, the acquisition
proposal from the high quality incumbent to the potential entrant should
yield this latter proﬁts RH at least equal to those obtained when market-
ing the innovation via de novo entry, namely Π
entry
F . On the other hand,
it is convenient for the incumbent H to make the acquisition proposal













when acquiring the innovator are larger than the proﬁts it would get
under innovator’s entry, namely Π
entry
H . From easy computations, it can
be proved that:
Proposition 2 The incentive for the incumbent ﬁrm H to block inno-
vator’s entry and thereby taking the ownership of the upward innovation
uF is stronger than the incentive to accommodate it while keeping the
existing variant uH on sale.
3This result is discussed in detail in Gabszewicz and Tarola (2011) where the issue
of innovation by acquisition considered in a diﬀerent perspective of analysis. Also,
we refer the interested reader to Bonisseau and Lahmandi Ayed (2006) for the study
of competition among more than two variants in a natural duopoly.
5
1525Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.2 pp. 1520-1529
Proof: See Appendix
Scenario B Now, I assume that in the case of de novo entry the high
quality incumbent acquires the rival L thereby moving to the downgrad-
ing product innovation uL. Thus, the acquisition agreement is evaluated
as follows. In order to be accepted by the potential entrant, the ac-
quisition proposal should yield the innovator proﬁts at least equal to
those obtained under de novo entry, namely
(uF−uL)(2b−a)2
9(b−a) . On the other
hand, it is convenient for the incumbent H to take the ownership of this
upgrading product innovation at some acquisition price if, and only if,










are larger than the proﬁts it











Notice however, that in this case the acquisition price to be paid coin-










it would get under this acquisition.
Accordingly, the high quality incumbent would earn zero proﬁts from the
acquisition of the innovator, whereas it obtains strictly positive proﬁts
from acquiring L and marketing the downgrading product. Thus,
Proposition 3 The incentive for the incumbent ﬁrm H to accommo-
date entry at the second stage of the game while marketing the down-
grading product uL is stronger than the incentive to block innovator’s
entry thereby taking the ownership of the upward innovation uF .
The two above propositions 2 and 3 show that two diﬀerent equilibria
may be observed in the market. Whenever the market is small and/or
the high quality incumbent’s variant uH is rather close to one of the
existing variants, then the incumbent chooses to accommodate entry
thereby taking the ownership of the downgrading innovation uL. In the
alternative case, the incumbent prefers to block innovator’s entry and
take the ownership of the upgrading innovation uF while withdrawing
its own good uH from the market. So, one can conclude that:
Proposition 4 Preemptive acquisition of the upgrading innovation is
not always the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have proved that when an upward innovation is made
available by a potential entrant, it is always oﬀered for sale in the mar-
ket. However and contrary to what intuitively can be guessed, it is not
always proﬁtable for an incumbent to take its ownership as to gain prof-
its deriving from its sale. It is important to remark the aspects of the
model that are crucial to my argument. First, the market is assumed
to be covered. Second, only two variants can simultaneously compete
6
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in the market. Both of these assumptions are used to deﬁne a natural
duopoly as reference market and thus keep the analysis as simplest as
possible. Of course, if the survival of a larger number of ﬁrms at equi-
librium would be considered, then the acquisition price for the upward
innovation would be no longer equal to zero as the low quality incumbent
could be still active under innovator’s entry. Notice however that these
restrictions do not alter the rationale developed here as the argument
underlying my conclusions could be extended with some changes to a
more general setting.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Notice that in order to be accepted, the
acquisition proposal by the high quality incumbent H should yield to
the low quality incumbent at the least the proﬁts Pa it would get in
the alternative scenario, namely in case of innovator’s entry without
7
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acquisition agreement. As in this latter case, the low quality incumbent
would be no longer active in the market (Π
entry
L = 0), then Pa = 0.
As far as the high quality incumbent ﬁrm, it ﬁnds it proﬁtable this
acquisition if the proﬁts in the case it acquires the low quality incumbent










are higher than the proﬁts it would
get without an acquiring L, namely Π
entry
H . Let me denote by x the
value b/a, f the value uF − uH, and g = uF − uL. As far as the high
quality incumbent H, the sign of the diﬀerence between proﬁts under





(b−a)(4uF−uH−3uL)2 has the same sign as






x2f (g − f)
(3g + f)
2 ,
under the assumption that x ∈ [2,4]. Notice that (i) P(f,x) is strictly




















2(10x2−4x+4) ). Thus, (i) whenever x =
2 the high quality incumbent prefers to sell its own variant thereby
avoiding to acquire the rival L whatever the value of f; (ii) when x ∈
(2,4], the high quality incumbent chooses to buy ﬁrm L whenever f ∈
[0,f−) or f ∈ (f+,g] and to not buy whenever f ∈ (f−,f+).Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The incentive to acquisition dominates
the incentive to open competition iﬀ the proﬁts that the two ﬁrms would
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.
de novo entry
Notice that the sign of the diﬀerence between proﬁts under acquisi-






(b−a)(4uF−uH−3uL)2 has the same sign as the second degree polyno-












under the assumption that x ∈ [2,4]. Notice that,
∂P(f,x)
∂x > 0 for any
x ∈ [2,4]. As P(f,2) > 0, I conclude that, the above diﬀerence is positive
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in the admissible range of x and thus acquiring the innovator is better
at the ﬁrst stage than openly competing against her at the second one.
Q.E.D
9
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